



Densification, private sector-led development, and social polarization in the global south: Lessons from a century of zoning in Bogotá[☆]

Juan G. Yunda^{a,1}, Bjørn Sletto^{b,*,2}

^a Departamento de Arquitectura, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia

^b School of Architecture, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Densification
Zoning
Polarization
Fragmentation
Bogotá

ABSTRACT

Faced with rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, cities in the Global South have relied on densification strategies to contend with sprawl, social polarization, and environmental risks. However, such densification strategies are shaped by evolving zoning policies which in turn are subject to tensions between private sector interests and public policy imperatives, leading to the emergence of new urban fabrics characterized by fragmentation and polarization. Bogotá, Colombia, provides an exemplary case of the unpredictable outcomes of zoning policies designed to foster densification, particularly in political contexts characterized by strong private market interests operating in tension with sustainability goals favored by the public sector. Partly due to strong private sector influences and investment strategies, the city is characterized by uneven densification patterns and continuing polarization despite zoning policies intended to limit urban growth and foster densification, in particular Acuerdo 7 from 1979 and Decreto 190 from 2004. The case of Bogotá illuminates the need for fine-grained, historical analysis to reveal the emergence of new urban fabrics in the Global South, particularly in cities where zoning policies designed to foster densification are influenced by strong private sector development interests.

1. Introduction

In rapidly growing cities in the Global South, sustainability concerns are driving densification and compact development strategies intended to reduce energy use, restrict sprawl, and limit environmental risk (Artmann, Inostroza, & Fan, 2019; Burgess & Jenks, 2002; Chobokoane & Horn, 2015; Dewar, 2000; Echenique, Hargreaves, Mitchell, & Namdeo, 2012; Libertun de Duren & Guerrero Compeán, 2016; Turok, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2015; Zhu, 2012). However, such densification strategies are increasingly influenced by private sector interests, as the focus of urban development has shifted from state-oriented planning to strategic planning approaches premised on the support of private real-estate developers. Pressures wrought by capitalist restructuring and real-estate development (Baviskar, 2003, p. 95) have prompted a shift to a “market-centric urbanism” (Brites, 2017), where state planners must balance sustainability priorities with the need to attract private investment. As a result of this subordination of planning “to the logic of profit and private property” (Arabindoo, 2009, p. 886), densification and compact development strategies have had the unintended effect of

producing increasing fragmentation and polarization in cities of the Global South (e.g. Caldeira, 1996; Davis, 2007; Graham & Marvin, 2001; Massey, 1996; Massey & Denton, 1988; Mele, 2011).

However, such structural explanations do not provide a comprehensive accounting of the role of private sector actors in shaping specific patterns of fragmentation and polarization in particular locales. Instead, it is necessary to examine local structures of political power and governance over time in order to understand such differentiated patterns of urban polarization and fragmentation (Allegra, Casaglia, & Rokem, 2012), particularly focusing on the actual work of urban planners as they draft strategies to foster densification while negotiating the interests of private sector actors. Because of this lacunae in the literatures on densification and divided cities, in the following we seek to demonstrate the utility of a fine-grained, situated historical analysis to explain the contradictory impacts of zoning ordinances on patterns of fragmentation and polarization, particularly in urban contexts characterized by increasing private sector authority. By examining the historical contingencies of zoning policies in the particular case of Bogotá, we respond to the call of Allegra et al. (2012) to develop case

[☆] This work was supported by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy under Grant .LUT11191

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: yunda.j@javeriana.edu.co (J.G. Yunda), bjorn@utexas.edu (B. Sletto).

¹ Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Departamento de Arquitectura, Carrera 7 # 40-62 Ed. 17, Bogotá, Colombia.

² The University of Texas at Austin, School of Architecture, 310 Inner Campus Drive Stop B7500, Austin, Texas 78712-1009, United States.

studies as a means of teasing out the nuanced political drivers of “divided cities,” “given the sheer complexity of urban life and conflicts” and the “tendency to over-theorization and reliance on single factor explanations of urban fragmentation” (p. 560; see also Robinson, 2011; van Kempen, 2007).

Zoning ordinances serve as particularly significant points of articulation between regulatory measures and market drivers, and, conversely, they are often key points of contention between public sector planners and private development actors. In the case of Bogotá, zoning codes influenced by growth control and densification priorities have been deployed continuously since the late 1970s. As a result, the city enjoys distinction as the densest city in Latin America and one of the most compact in the world, comparable to Asian cities such as Mumbai, New Delhi, Hong Kong or Lagos. With 196 persons per hectare, Bogotá was the densest among the 26 cities listed in the *Atlas of Urban Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean* (NYU, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, & UN-Habitat, 2010). A study by Inostroza, Baur, and Csaplovics (2013) found that Bogotá was almost twice as densely populated as the second-densest city in the region, Lima, Peru, with 213.8 persons per hectare compared to Lima's 133.1. And in a comparison with 24 metropolitan regions across five continents, Bogotá emerged as the densest with 24,643 persons per square kilometer (Wheeler, 2015).

However, densification processes in Bogotá have been heavily shaped by the private housing sector (Guzman, Oviedo, & Bocarejo, 2017), which has led to extreme residential segregation, “selective modernization” (Delgadillo, 2016), and uneven concentrations of economic activity (Aliaga-Linares & Alvarez-Rivadulla, 2010; SDP & UNAL, 2013). Land entrepreneurialism (Blanco, 2012) coupled with the practice of arranged urbanism (Koch, 2015) have prompted contradictory densification and “verticalization” strategies, which in turn have resulted in a more socially fragmented and polarized city (Aquino & Gainza, 2014; Bensús Talavera, 2018; Jiménez Romera & Torres-Tovar, 2014; Montenegro-Miranda, 2018; Vergara Vidal, 2017; Yunda, 2019).

In the northern parts of the city, higher income neighborhoods are denser in terms of built form, while lower income areas on the southern periphery are denser in terms of population, reflecting conditions of overcrowding of families in small and precarious self-help structures (Rincón-Avellaneda, 2004). During the past decade, the northern, relatively wealthy districts of Usaquén, Chapinero, and Suba together accounted for more than half of the new residential and commercial construction projects in the city. Meanwhile, the production of affordable housing continues to decline and is now restricted almost exclusively to the localities of Ciudad Bolívar and Usme and the neighboring municipality of Soacha, all on the southern, poorest fringes of Bogotá (Bogotá Cómo Vamos, 2018; Bustamante-Palma, 2015; Yunda, 2019). Beyond creating patterns of uneven densification, these spatially differentiated levels of real estate investment continue to reproduce spatial inequalities, most notoriously in terms of the distribution of economic opportunities. Jobs are concentrated in the northern part of the city where the most affluent residents live, requiring low-income workers living mainly in the south and west to endure tortuous daily commutes in a clogged transit system (Guzman & Bocarejo, 2017).

To reveal the historical and political drivers of this emergence of a fragmented yet polarized urban fabric, in the following we focus on Acuerdo 7, a policy passed in 1979 which instituted an urban growth boundary and a system of lot-by-lot incremental densification, and Decreto 190, the comprehensive plan from 2004 which required developers to set aside land or money for affordable housing and infrastructure improvements before densification projects would be approved. To avoid an overly structuralist and reductionist explanation for the complex patterns of polarization of fragmentation in Bogotá, our analysis is informed by the personal perspectives and experiences of Bogotá-based planning practitioners captured in interviews during the years 2016–2017. These insights from planning practitioners allow us to provide an empirically and ethnographically based assessment to

better reveal the relationship between zoning policies, private sector interests, and the concurrent patterns of fragmentation and polarization observed in Bogotá. Although our analysis does not aim to compare actual densification outcomes with stated planning goals, as exemplified by Chobokoane and Horn's (2015) study of spatial impacts of densifications policies in Bloemfontein, South Africa, our work here is inspired by their incorporation of census data with spatial modeling to better understand the spatial implications of private-sector influence on zoning policy.

It bears noting that our analysis here focuses on the complex articulations between private sector interests and public policy in shaping zoning policies and hence uneven patterns of urban densification. Our fine-grained, temporal, and ethnographically informed spatial analysis precluded critical consideration of other important drivers of polarization and fragmentation such as racial politics and informal urban development. However, we contend that such a critical, ethnographically informed analysis of planning and policy instruments coupled with spatial modeling of densification patterns provides for more nuanced understandings of the concurrent fragmentation and polarization of urban form (see e.g. Allegra et al., 2012; Robinson, 2011; Till & Schneider, 2012). While the private real estate development sector is far from monolithic, and zoning and other public sector policy-making is far from the determinant driver of real estate investment decisions, our analysis suggests that these contradictory densification patterns may, in part, have been driven by real estate development actors working in contradiction with public policies intended to alleviate spatial segregation.

2. Polarization, fragmentation, and private sector-led urban development

In the 1970s, cities in the Global North began adopting zoning measures such as urban growth boundaries to achieve sustainability goals through densification. While such densification strategies were originally designed for sprawling cities in North America, planners in the Global South also adopted similar approaches, albeit often with unintended outcomes. Rapidly growing Asian cities such as Delhi and Calcutta and emerging world cities in Africa such as Cape Town were characterized by high levels of informality, limited public sector resources, increasing land values in city centers, lack of infrastructure capacity, and difficulties in controlling rural-urban migration (see e.g. Burgess, 2000). Nevertheless, despite the very different social and economic conditions in these rapidly growing cities, “the idea of a larger regional circling-in to create a metropolitan area appealed very much to the planners of developing countries” (Arabindoo, 2009, p. 884). Densification became seen as a means to reduce land consumption, foster agglomeration economies, improve social inclusion and integration, enhance biodiversity, and reduce energy consumption (Turok, 2011; Zhu, 2012).

However, this transfer of practices of densification and compact development from the Global North, occurring within a context of globalization, economic restructuring, and neoliberalization, may instead be a driver of social polarization (Fainstein & Gordon, 1992; Mele, 2011; Mollenkopf & Castells, 1991; Sassen, 2013; for East Asia see e.g. Huang, Yan, & Wu, 2016; Liu & Chen, 2017; for South Asia, see e.g. Arabindoo, 2009; Baviskar, 2003; for Africa, see e.g. Chobokoane & Horn, 2015; Badmos, Rienow, Callo-Concha, Greve, & Jürgens, 2019; Turok, 2011). Research examining the origins and implications of such “divided cities” have called attention to patterns of spatial segregation (Caldeira, 1996; Massey, 1996; Massey & Denton, 1988), fragmentation (Davis, 2007; Graham & Marvin, 2001), and privatization of urban space (Atkinson & Blandy, 2007; Glasze, 2006; Glasze & Alkhayyal, 2002).

In the Latin American context, Griffin and Ford (1980) suggested that the growth pattern of Latin American cities could be understood as a product of polarization between high and low-income areas.

A GENERALIZED MODEL OF LATIN AMERICAN CITY STRUCTURE




Fig. 1. Model of Latin American City Structure in Bogotá.
Source: Griffin and Ford (1980).

According to Griffin and Ford, Latin American cities grew in concentric circles and spines outwards from the old colonial core towards the suburban fringes (Fig. 1; top). Griffin and Ford used Bogotá as an example of their model, defining the commercial spine as the trolley lines

that reached into the northern suburb known as Chapinero (Fig. 1; bottom). As the elite moved outwards from the traditional core and low-income residents were forced to settle on the urban fringe, socio-economic inequalities were increasingly made manifest in a polarized

urban landscape.

However, neoliberal land deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s opened the door to global investments in real estate and infrastructure development, triggering massive speculation and development pressures on the urban fringe (Caldeira & Holston, 2005). The result was the emergence of a new urban form characterized by “fragments,” i.e. islands populated by different social groups that live in proximity to one another, but each enclosed by man-made security borders such as fences or gates (Borsdorf & Hidalgo, 2010; Janoschka, 2002; Thibert & Osorio, 2014). Examples of fragmentation in Latin America include the sprawling gated communities in the periphery of Sao Paulo and Curitiba (Caldeira, 1996; Irazábal, 2006); the new suburban developments on the fringes of Buenos Aires (Schapira & Pineda, 2008); and the peripheries of Santiago and Valparaíso (Borsdorf, Hidalgo, & Sánchez, 2007). More recently, Santana-Rivas (2013) and Otalora-Moya (2014) have argued that the islands of wealth and poverty in the savanna surrounding Bogotá are also a result of fragmentation.

Scholars are divided on the social and urban-morphological implications of fragmentation, seeing both positive (Rasse, 2015; Sabatini & Brain, 2008; Sabatini & Salcedo, 2007; Salcedo, 2010) and negative (Janoschka & Sequera, 2016; Ruiz-Tagle, 2015) consequences of the new forms of exchange between formerly segregated social groups in a fragmented city. For instance, researchers in the 1960s and 1970s found strong social ties and solidarity in informal settlements (Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Perlman, 1976; Turner, 1976), but forty years later, these same communities were characterized by violence, social immobility, and persistent segregation (de la Rocha, 2001; Eckstein, 1990; Perlman, 2010; Roberts, 2011). Conversely, other researchers suggest that the proximity of high-income and low income groups may bring unexpected benefits. Gentrification of ghettos in Santiago may improve the conditions of the poor as fragmentation provides them with a safer, more diverse, and inclusive urban environment (Rasse, 2015; Sabatini & Brain, 2008), new employment opportunities, and better urban services (Salcedo, 2010). At the same time, fragmentation has also been accompanied by flexibilization of labor markets, placing further pressure on the middle class while limiting their access to mortgages (Thibert & Osorio, 2014). As a result, rising property values have led to the displacement of low-income households from the city center to remote areas that lack proper urban services, leading ironically to new forms of polarization.

Even though fragmentation is commonly associated with neoliberal development starting in the 1980s and 1990s, Blanco (2012) suggests that “land entrepreneurialism” has driven the development of informal urbanization in Bogotá since at least the 1960s. Similarly, Montoya (2012) argues that private sector agents have historically played a more significant role than the state in shaping urban growth and morphological changes in Bogotá. From Montoya's perspective, the most important private sector agents include private real estate developers, represented by large property owners, development firms, and builders, and the social organizations which have driven the development of the informal city. Furthermore, Bolaños Palacios (2011) explores how private sector developers and banks shape the morphology of Bogotá through the housing prototype that he refers to as “conjunto cerrado.” A conjunto cerrado consists of a tight cluster of housing towers located within a single city block, typically encircled by high walls equipped with security devices such as CCTV, electrified fences and gates, providing an added sense of security to the residents and higher profits for developers and land owners (Bolaños Palacios, 2011).

Such private sector influence over urban development patterns has also been conceptualized as “arranged urbanism” (Koch, 2015). Based on a study of the 2000 comprehensive plan in Barranquilla, Colombia, Koch argues that the areas set aside for urban growth were drawn through informal means by a company that owned these lands. Facing a shortage of professionals in planning, the city brought in former employees of the company to draft the planning rules, impact fees, and urban design standards for these new developments. This process

resulted in a fragmentary, car-oriented urban form, including socially selective walled enclaves and shopping malls instead of affordable housing or public amenities such as urban parks.

Ultimately, the devolution of the authority of the state in favor of the private sector has complex implications for urban form, as suggested by the proliferation of concepts and typologies (Allegra et al., 2012) to explain the development of divided cities. Given the complex drivers of these evolving spatial patterns, it is necessary to examine the contested evolution of specific planning policies within their historical, political and economic contexts to better understand their role in producing divided cities. As Allegra et al. (2012) suggest, “in order to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of urban fragmentation, we should focus more on cities than on abstract categories, and provide for conceptual tools that can serve as a background for in-depth case study analysis dealing with the intricate and localized nature of the phenomena of spatial polarization” (p. 563). In the following, we examine the evolution and spatial implications of zoning ordinances intended to foster densification in Bogotá, both as a means of illuminating the drivers of processes of polarization and fragmentation but also to provide an exemplary case-study approach to the study of divided cities.

3. A century of zoning in Bogotá: uneven development and Social polarization

3.1. 1923–1979: division between *Residencial Exclusivo* and *Residencial Obrero*

Urban planning in Bogotá began in 1923 with the “Bogotá Futuro” plan, inspired by the *Ensanche* plan of Idelfons Cerdá in Barcelona, Burnham's plan for Chicago, and the urban design concepts presented at the World's Columbian Exposition (Goossens, 2018). Bogotá Futuro called for a street geometry consisting of a grid of orthogonal streets crossed by a network of diagonal avenues with urban services such as churches, parks and schools located at the crossroads. As the principal promoter of the plan, Ricardo Olano, stated in 1917, the goal was to “place the public buildings in convenient groupings, for instance surrounding a plaza or in the midst of a garden, in this way to benefit from their efficiency, and for them to have access to abundant natural light and contribute with their facades to the beauty of the city” (quoted by Goossens, 2018, p. 61).³

Bogotá Futuro was never implemented due to a lack of resources and a proper regulatory framework. It was only with the appointment of Austrian urbanist Karl Brunner as chair of the newly established Bogotá planning department in 1934 that the city started to follow a predetermined design. Brunner deployed the rules of “City Planning According to Artistic Principles” (Sitte, 1889) to design neighborhoods that consciously considered the pedestrian scale, incorporating sinuous streets, vistas, and elements of nature. Brunner pursued a wide range of urban planning projects, ranging from the development of upscale housing neighborhoods such as “San Luis” and “Bosque Izquierdo” in the northern and central areas of Bogotá to improvements of informal settlements along the eastern fringes of “Paseo Bolívar”, while also designing early social housing initiatives in the “Restrepo” and “Olaya” neighborhoods at the south.

Despite Brunner's prolific work, by the 1940s local architects, some fresh from the recently created architecture program at the Universidad Nacional, began to criticize his piecemeal approach to urbanism. Educated in the new European principles of rational planning promoted by the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM), they favored the modernist movement of urbanism emerging in Western Europe. Eventually Brunner was removed from his position, and the 1940s became defined by a new debate between those favoring the

³ Translated by the authors.



Fig. 2. Zoning map of the Acuerdo 21, 1944.

Source: Cuéllar-Sánchez, M., & Mejía-Pavony, G. (2007). *Atlas histórico de Bogotá. Cartografía 1791–2007*. Bogotá D.C.: IDPC.

European modernist approaches exemplified by CIAM principles and those who called for a US model of urban planning as codified by the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZA) of 1924 (Salazar-Ferro, 2007). This model was based on the development of land-use and road plans to indirectly control the interventions of the private sector. Faced with increasing pressures from landowners and private sector developers, the administration of Mayor Jorge Soto (1944–1944) enacted Acuerdo 21, the city's first zoning code (Fig. 3). Drawing on the principles of the SZA, the plan was overseen by the secretary of public works, Alfredo Bateman, and became known as the Plan Soto-Bateman (El Consejo de Bogotá, 1944) (Fig. 2).

Instead of developing normative designs for urban growth as Brunner and CIAM had proposed, the Plan Soto-Bateman was based on a separation of the city into different areas. These corresponded with the perceived division of the city between elite areas, working class areas, and middle-income areas. Informed by these assumptions of urban structure, Acuerdo 21 delineated commercial, institutional, industrial, and differentiated housing zones based on their morphology and social composition, including category B. *Residencial Transformable* (“incremental residential”) in middle-income central areas; C. *Estrictamente Residencial* (“strictly residential”) in the wealthier areas in the north; and E. *Residencial Obrero* (“working-class residential”) in the lower-income areas in the south and west. Each zone had clearly defined land-use mixes and density maximums. In the exclusively residential zones, land uses other than housing were prohibited and densities were kept low, while in working class zones, densities were high and land uses were flexible. As a result, the plan codified and further incentivized the emerging differences in built form between the higher income areas located in the northeast along the foothills and the lower income areas, primarily located in the south and west.

In 1948, a group of influential architects pressured the Mayor of Bogotá to commission Town Planning Associates (TPA), one of the leading planning firms in the world led by Josep Lluís Sert and Swiss architect Le Corbusier, to develop “Plan Director,” the city's first, modernist comprehensive master plan. Le Corbusier envisioned a city with wide avenues and high-rise residential complexes with a strict separation of land uses, where growth was oriented along the north-

south axis in the foothills where land was more suitable for urbanization. The Plan Director sought to *sanear* (“sanitize”) the city by erasing the widespread substandard settlements and replacing them with multistory housing units following the style of the famous “Unité d'Habitation” designed by Le Corbusier. The only areas slated for preservation were the neighborhoods developed for the wealthy in the northeastern section of the city, many designed by Brunner. The Plan Director, however, was never enforced. By the time the plan had been completed, the dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas-Pinilla (1953–1957) had embarked on a series of major construction works that included highways, a new airport, and an administrative center. These infrastructure projects were built in areas seen as convenient for development, including floodplains and wetlands on the western fringes of the city, in disregard of any previous planning frameworks or site assessments.

While the Plan Director estimated the city would grow from half a million people in 1947 to triple that size by the year 2000, it took just 20 years for the city's population to surpass this mark. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the population of Bogotá's grew at an annual rate of 7%—one of the highest in the world—prompting the mayoral administration of Jorge Gaitán (1961–1966) to introduce the notion of a “flexible plan” to incentivize the production of housing by the private sector. This new approach included new rules for urban expansion based on market demands and the establishment of a Planning Commission to negotiate planning norms with property owners on a case-by-case basis (El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá, 1963). The flexible plan was introduced by Decreto 1119 in 1968 and served to reproduce the spatial patterns of housing typologies set by the Plan Soto-Bateman. In Fig. 3 we observe the former northern higher income strictly residential areas renamed as UDB. *Urbanizable en Densidad Baja* (“low density urbanization” in orange); and the working class areas renamed as UDA. *Urbanizable en Densidad Alta* (“high density urbanization” in yellow) primarily found in the south and west.

By the 1970s the urbanization of the periphery was a reality, driven largely by annexation of surrounding municipalities and the construction of roads. Massive sprawl along the access highways eventually formed an octopus-shaped city. At the same time, impoverished




Fig. 3. Zoning map of Decreto 1119 of 1968.
Source: DAPD. (1973). *Programa Integrado de Desarrollo Urbano de la Zona Oriental de Bogotá*. Bogotá D.E.

peasants displaced by violence and lack of economic opportunities were acquiring small lots from pirate developers in illegal subdivisions found in even more remote, peripheral areas. The overwhelming scale of these rapidly growing informal settlements prompted the city to implement land tenure programs to allow the public sector to invest in their improvement. Acuerdo 30 ([El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá, 1961](#)) and the subsequent Acuerdo 65 ([El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá, 1967](#)) introduced new urban form regulations to address the challenge of informal urbanization. These new regulations divided the city in areas of low, middle, and high density, and introduced new minimum rules to regulate self-help housing and control pirate developers. However, the minimum rules reduced minimum lot areas to 65 square meters and minimum lot fronts to 5 m, further increasing the typological differences between the residential areas in the northeast and in the south. By the end of the decade the north had developed an appearance similar to North-American suburbs with wide roads, large houses, front yards and parks. The south, meanwhile, was characterized by small parcels, limited green areas, narrow unpaved roads, and poor services, turning informal settlements into slums where poverty and disease were widespread.

3.2. 1979–2004: Acuerdo 7 brings continuing polarization

Faced with continuing population growth and uncontrolled sprawl, by the end of the 1970s Bogotá's planning authorities attempted to limit the increasing influence of private developers and construction firms. Mostly controlled by important local families, six of the construction

firms based in Bogotá are today among the 100 largest companies in Colombia (“100 empresas más grandes de Colombia,” 2017) and as a whole, the private construction sector accounts for a large share of the Colombian economy. The large construction firms now form the core of the powerful National Builders' Association (CAMACOL), which seeks to influence urban planning at both local and national level, and individual developers have long been prominent supporters of the political campaigns of mayors and key city council members (Hernández Osorio, 2015).

Given the pressure of these large, private construction firms to increase densities in the north of the city (Coronell, 2019; Marín Correa & Flórez Suárez, 2016), city authorities sought to regulate locations for private investment through an incremental redevelopment process known as lot-by-lot densification, *Densificación Predio-a-Predio* (DAPD, 1981, p. 3). Under this incremental densification policy, which was codified via Acuerdo 7 in 1979, zoning limitations on dwelling density would be removed in specific areas in the central city, allowing one- to two-story houses to be replaced with multi-story, multifamily condominiums. While Acuerdo 7 was intended to stimulate but also manage private sector-led redevelopment in the central areas of the city, this incremental densification policy ushered in a period Saldarriaga-Roa (2000) refers to as *La Ciudad Inmobiliaria* (“The Real Estate City”). As (Cortés-Solano, 2007, p. 198) points out, instead of reducing the influence of private developers, Acuerdo 7 prioritized a morphological rather than regulatory perspective, thus providing private developers with greater freedom to shape the urban form of Bogotá.




Fig. 4. Zoning map in the Acuerdo 7 of 1979.

Source: Adapted from Ordenamiento y Administración del Espacio Urbano en Bogotá (DAPD, 1981).

Acuerdo 7 was inspired by *Fase 2*, an urban development study financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). *Fase 2* sought to mitigate urban sprawl and social polarization by reorienting urban growth to infill areas, thus decentralizing jobs and services in a set of sub-centers connected by transit and located in close proximity to residential areas. Known as *Ciudades dentro de la Ciudad* (“Cities Inside Cities”), this growth strategy introduced an Urban Services Boundary (USB) to limit expansion and removed density and land-use controls to incentivize incremental densification. In Fig. 4, the proposed mixed-use areas and multi-use transit corridors are marked in dark gray, forming a rectangular central area from which tentacles stretch towards sub-centers in peripheral neighborhoods, while the USB is delineated with a dot-dash line. Today, *Ciudad Salitre*, a multiuse and economically vibrant sub-center located close to the airport, is the only successful remaining *Ciudades dentro de la Ciudad* project. Other multiuse projects became merely isolated and small-scale housing developments, such as *Ciudad Bachué* in the west and *Ciudad Tunal* and *Ciudad Bolívar* in the south, and did not alter the polarized structure of the city.

Acuerdo 7 regulated incremental densification through the delineation of zones named *Tratamientos*, areas defined by the age, location, level of decay, and current physical characteristics of neighborhoods. Older areas would receive a *Tratamiento* designation that allowed for higher dwelling densities, thus increasing potential profits for the private sector. Although Acuerdo 7 was intended to reduce polarization, the areas zoned for incremental densification were quite extensive, allowing private developers to select areas for investment which they deemed more profitable. As a result, wealthier areas in the northeast received more private sector investment than lower-income, isolated areas in the south of the city (DAPD, 2000, p. 85). As Borrero-Ochoa (2000, p. 18) explains, “(In Colombia) the value of the land depends on

the social strata that occupies it. The experience of our cities indicates that the higher social strata lead development. Around them tend to cluster the middle social strata. The planning system then, segregates the popular levels from the high and middle social strata.” Ultimately, Acuerdo 7 therefore served to foster polarization of Bogotá, this time not by sprawl but via uneven densification.

3.3. 2004–2019: Decreto 190, private sector dominance, and uneven densification

In another attempt to curb the influence of the private sector over urban development, in 1997 the new National Law of Territorial Ordering, known as Ley 388, required urban planning to comply with principles of social equity, including the “right to the city” and the “social purpose of private property.” In 2004 Bogotá used this law to enact Decreto 190, a new comprehensive plan that sought to discourage further incremental densification, a process which had brought great profits to developers but had overburdened existing roads, parks, and utility infrastructures (DAPD, 2000, p. 101).

However, in spite of the laudable intentions of Ley 388, Decreto 190 cemented the uneven densification patterns triggered by Acuerdo 7 through the codification of different densification norms (*consolidaciones*) for different neighborhoods (Fig. 5). In areas classified as *Consolidación Urbanística*, heights were limited to three to five floors, and in areas categorized as *Consolidación con Densificación Moderada* limits were set at five or six floors. However, in areas coded as *Consolidación con Cambio de Patrón* there were no height limits. Instead, densities were regulated through Floor-to-Area Ratios of up to 5.5, which would allow for buildings with more than ten floors. In a zoning decision that would cement and accelerate the uneven densification in




Fig. 5. Zoning map Decreto 190 of 2004.

Source: DAPD. (2000). *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial de Bogotá POT, Documento Técnico de Soporte*. Bogotá D.C.: DAPD.

Bogotá, the neighborhoods classified as *Consolidación con Cambio de Patrón* (colored in red in Fig. 5) were overwhelmingly clustered in wealthier areas in the northern sections of the city, further benefiting powerful real estate development interests.

In order to comply with Ley 388, Decreto 190 also set the norms for the *Planes Parciales de Renovación Urbana* (PPRUs), a planning tool akin to the US Planned Unit Development which requires private developers to provide public spaces and affordable housing units in return for permission to erect multistory for-profit housing and retail areas. However, PPRUs must be negotiated between developers, the city, and the public, and they require the approval of at least 51% of the land owners in the area. This makes PPRUs lengthy and costly processes. More than ten years following the passage of Decreto 190, only six PPRUs have been adopted while 19 PPRUs have been denied by the city or abandoned by private developers originally involved in the process (Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2016). Instead, private developers have found it easier and cheaper to keep investing in real estate under the incremental densification regulations established through Acuerdo 7 than through the more social justice oriented PPRU process (Ortiz, 2017).

In addition to formalizing the PPRU process, Decreto 190 also led to the establishment of 117 so-called *Unidades de Planeación Zonal* (UPZs; “Local Planning Units”). Intended to incentivize local participation in planning, each UPZ was tasked with developing neighborhood-level land-use and density regulations in accordance with the broader goals of Decreto 190. However, according to interviews with planners, the UPZ process is dominated by private sector representatives who seek densification in higher income areas, and the participatory process is often exclusionary and unwelcoming. According to local planners who participated in the zoning process, in the UPZ known as Chicó-Lago in Chapinero, a prominent, high-income area classified as Estrato 6, the participatory planning meetings “were held in luxury hotels with the

attendance of prominent lawyers and developers.” Such intimidating settings with their strict norms of conduct make it exceedingly difficult for residents to participate and influence the zoning process. Because of the pressures exerted by developers and the restrictions imposed on resident participation, the UPZ process often result in zoning regulations that foster uneven densification at the expense of community interests. For example, the zoning regulations that emerged from the UPZ process in Los Cedros allowed for the construction of large-scale, multistory condominium complexes in an area that had previously been occupied by two-story terrace housing. After only a few years of development, the sewage and road infrastructure came close to collapse due to over-development (Gómez, 2012). Local residents had to mobilize in order to change the zoning code and restrict building heights to six stories (Aguilera, 2015; Redacción El Tiempo, 2016).

This private sector influence over the development of zoning codes and the resulting, uneven patterns of densification is reflected in the spatial distribution of building permits for residential towers with more than six stories. A spatial analysis of 2062 permits for residential use and 236 permits for nonresidential use (office and retail) for the period from January 2010 to December 2015 shows a significant concentration of permits in wealthier areas in the northeast of the city. The majority of the 2062 permits for residential use were awarded to projects in the localities of Usaquén and Chapinero (Fig. 6, Map A), while the 236 nonresidential permits were primarily restricted to the Chapinero (Fig. 6, Map B). The residential and non-residential projects in Usaquén and Chapinero are also overall larger in size than projects in other areas of the city, illustrating that development still clusters along the northern wedge of the city, in clear contrast with the city structure envisioned in Acuerdo 7. While the comprehensive plan aims to consolidate a mega-core that grows from the foothills towards the airport, in reality real estate development follows the foothills towards the north in a form of urban polarization hypothesized by Griffin and Ford




Fig. 6. Map A, Residential densification permits by size of development 2010–2014. Map B, Non-Residential densification permits by size of development 2010–2014.

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the SDP.

(1980). In addition, while Decreto 190 aimed to cluster development in a set of sub-centers in both the northern and southern peripheries, our analysis of building permits shows a significant clustering of residential towers and commercial projects in Usaquén and Chapinero and very little development of multifamily structures elsewhere.

This uneven densification is also reflected in the historical evolution of urban morphology in Bogotá, as illustrated in the figure of two

archetypal urban blocks (Fig. 7). The uppermost figure in the left column illustrates an area initially zoned as Residencial Exclusivo in the 1940s, reflecting a code similar to that of a North American mid-century suburb. The topmost block in the second column represents a typical working-class area in the south of Bogotá during the same period, consisting of small plots and self-built homes. As Fig. 7 illustrates, the morphology of these two blocks evolved very differently over time as a




Fig. 7. Differential evolution of two archetypal blocks in Bogotá. Elaborated by First Author.

result of uneven densification. The Residencial Exclusivo block received more investment from developers and construction companies and more generous heights allowances through the evolving zoning codes, prompting its transformation from single family houses to large residential towers. Conversely, the Residencial Obrero block receives less private investment and any changes to the morphology are due mostly to informal horizontal and vertical expansions.

4. Conclusions

Our analysis of historical and current morphological patterns in Bogotá indicates that densification remains driven by private sector interests despite the best intentions of urban planning instruments and zoning regulations, resulting in highly uneven densification patterns. Planning and zoning instruments introduced between the 1940s and the 1970s prompted segregation between wealthier areas of suburban

housing in the northeastern sectors of the city, which were easily accessed via major roads with important commercial and institutional activities, and isolated peripheries in the south and west characterized by self-made homes and poor infrastructure services. Acuerdo 7 and Decreto 190 were introduced to address the polarization problem but instead facilitated private sector dominance over housing provision, which in turn led to continuing polarization. At the same time, this private sector influence in urban planning and development has fostered incipient fragmentation in other areas of the city.

In order to better understand the development of these uneven patterns of densification in Bogotá, we found it necessary to consider the unpredictable articulation of urban planning policies with the interests of the private sector. By critically assessing the respective roles of the public sector and the private real estate sector in driving the development of zoning ordinances, based in empirically grounded spatial analysis of urban form which integrates historiographic research

with ethnographic accounts, we were able to trace the development of uneven patterns of densification over time. Although planning legislation or instruments like zoning do not determine where private actors choose to build, making it impossible to posit a simple causality between private sector interests and patterns of densification, the case of Bogotá reminds us that private sector actors seek to shape density and land-use regulations in order to maximize profits from land and housing markets. These complex relationships between public and private interests may contribute to patterns of densification that reproduce but also contradict long-established residential segregation patterns.

Beyond Bogotá, this analysis reveals the importance of historicizing the development of zoning codes, not merely to develop historiographies of planning but also to understand how new urban fabrics elsewhere in the Global South are produced through tensions between sustainability priorities and private sector interests. While the prevailing discourse of densification and growth management has come to shape urban planning across the Global South, the contradictory impacts of this transfer of planning principles from the Global North differ widely and are contingent on different historical experiences and political-economic contexts. As we have suggested through our analysis of fragmentation and polarization in Bogotá, paying attention to the everyday work of implementing zoning instruments allows us to illuminate a crucial dimension of the complex yet situated struggle between state actors, powerful private conglomerates, and marginalized groups. By examining the contestations surrounding zoning policies through grounded and case-based research, we are better able to critically assess the contradictory ways in which densification is actually implemented under different historical conditions, and what this means for urban polarization and fragmentation. Such grounded research on the historiography of zoning codes and their contestation is particularly important today, as the increasingly complex articulations between government imperatives and private sector interests is leading to unpredictable dissolution and shifting of spatial arrangements and hence new divisions in cities across the Global South. As in the case of the shift from polarization to fragmentation in Latin American cities, these unpredictable spatial transformations are driven by complex, contested relationships between a variety of actors, including planners and real estate developers, which in turn are mediated through the mundane yet critically important domain of zoning ordinances.

Declaration of competing interests

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

References

- 100 empresas más grandes de Colombia (2017). *Revista Semana*. April 29. Retrieved from <http://semana.com>.
- Aguilera, L. (2015, April 20). *Construcciones en Cedritos se limitarían a seis pisos*. El Tiempo.
- Aliaga-Linares, L., & Alvarez-Rivadulla, M. J. (2010). Segregación residencial en Bogotá a través del tiempo y diferentes escalas (Working Paper No. WP10LL1SP; p. 46). Retrieved from Lincoln Institute of Land Policy website http://www.lincolnst.edu/pubs/1833_Segregaci%C3%B3n-residencial-en-Bogot%C3%A1-a-trav%C3%A9s-del-tiempo-y-diferentes-escalas.
- Allegra, M., Casaglia, A., & Rokem, J. (2012). The political geographies of urban polarization: A critical review of research on divided cities. *Geography Compass*, 6(9), 560–574. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2012.00506.x>.
- Aquino, F., & Gainza, X. (2014). Understanding density in an Uneven City, Santiago de Chile: Implications for social and environmental sustainability. *Sustainability*, 6(9), 5876–5897.
- Arabindoo, P. (2009). Falling apart at the margins? Neighbourhood transformations in peri-urban Chennai. *Development and Change*, 40(5), 879–901. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01587.x>.
- Artmann, M., Inostroza, L., & Fan, P. (2019). Urban sprawl, compact urban development and green cities. How much do we know, how much do we agree? *Ecological Indicators*, 96, 3–9. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2018.10.059>.
- Atkinson, R., & Blandy, S. (2007). *Gated communities*. Routledge.
- Badmos, O. S., Rienow, A., Callo-Concha, D., Greve, K., & Jürgens, C. (2019). Simulating slum growth in Lagos: An integration of rule based and empirical based model. *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems*, 77, 101369. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compenurbysys.2019.101369>.
- Baviskar, A. (2003). Between violence and desire: Space, power, and identity in the making of metropolitan Delhi. *International Social Science Journal*, 55(175), 89–98. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.5501009>.
- Bensús Talavera, V. (2018). Densificación (no) planificada de una metrópoli. El caso del Área Metropolitana de Lima 2000–2014. *Revista INVI*, 33(92), 9–51. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-83582018000100009>.
- Blanco, A. G. (2012). Discourses of land allocation and natural property rights: Land entrepreneurialism and informal settlements in Bogotá, Colombia. *Planning Theory*, 11(1), 20–43. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095211403124>.
- Bogotá Cómo Vamos (2018). *Informe de Calidad de Vida en Bogotá 2017*. Bogotá: Bogotá Cómo Vamos 213.
- Bolaños Palacios, Á. (2011). Las formas urbanas como modelo. La planificación y la urbanización de vivienda como agentes de cambio en la forma del tejido de la ciudad, Bogotá 1948–2000. *Revista de Arquitectura*, 13, 23–37.
- Borrero-Ochoa, O. (2000). *Avalúos de Inmuebles y Garantías*. Bogotá: Bhandar Editores Ltda.
- Borsdorf, A., & Hidalgo, R. (2010). From polarization to fragmentation. Recent changes in Latin American urbanization. In P. van Lindert, & O. Verkoren (Eds.). *Decentralized development in Latin America: Experiences in local governance and local development* (pp. 23–34). Amsterdam: Springer.
- Borsdorf, A., Hidalgo, R., & Sánchez, R. (2007). A new model of urban development in Latin America: The gated communities and fenced cities in the metropolitan areas of Santiago de Chile and Valparaíso. *Cities*, 24(5), 365–378. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2007.04.002>.
- Brites, W. F. (2017). La ciudad en la encrucijada neoliberal. Urbanismo mercado-céntrico y desigualdad socio-espacial en América Latina. *Urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana*, 9(3), 573–586. <https://doi.org/10.1590/2175-3369.009.003.a014>.
- Burgess, R., & Jenks, M. (2002). *Compact cities: Sustainable urban forms for developing countries*. Routledge.
- Burgess, R. (2000). The compact city debate: a global perspective. In M. Jenks, & R. Burgess (Eds.). *Compact cities: Sustainable urban forms for developing countries* (pp. 9–24). London: Spon Press.
- Bustamante-Palma, B. R. (2015, June 23). Usaquén concentra la mayor participación en la construcción de vivienda en Bogotá. Retrieved from Observatorio de Desarrollo Económico website <http://observatorio.desarrolloeconomico.gov.co/base/lectorpublic.php?id=550#sthash.oZlOB5a.vSzep5cY.dpbs>.
- Caldeira, T. (1996). Fortified enclaves: The new urban segregation. *Public Culture*, 8, 303–328.
- Caldeira, T., & Holston, J. (2005). State and urban space in Brazil: From modernist planning to democratic interventions. *Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems*. London: Blackwell.
- Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (2016). Boletín Renovación Urbana en Bogotá No 4. Retrieved from http://bibliotecadigital.ccb.org.co/bitstream/handle/11520/18249/Boletin_RU_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
- Chobokoane, N., & Horn, A. (2015). Urban compaction and densification in Bloemfontein, South Africa: Measuring the current urban form against Mangaung metropolitan municipality's spatial planning proposals for compaction. *Urban Forum*, 26, 77–93. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-014-9233-5>.
- Coronell, D. (2019). La tras escena. February 16. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved from <http://semana.com>.
- Cortés-Solano, R. (2007). Del urbanismo a la planeación en Bogotá (1900–1990) esquema inicial y materiales para pensar la trama de un relato. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 11(1), 160–213.
- DAPD (1981). *Ordenamiento y Administración del Espacio Urbano en Bogotá*. Bogotá D.E.: DAPD.
- DAPD (2000). *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial de Bogotá POT, Documento Técnico de Soporte*. Bogotá D.C: DAPD.
- Davis, M. (2007). *Planet of slums*. Verso.
- de la Rocha, M. G. (2001). From the resources of poverty to the poverty of resources? The Erosion of a survival model. *Latin American Perspectives*, 28(4), 72–100.
- Delgadillo, V. (2016). Selective modernization of Mexico City and its historic center. Gentrification without displacement? *Urban Geography*, 37(8), 1154–1174. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2015.1096114>.
- Dewar, D. (2000). The relevance of the compact city approach: The management of growth in South African cities. In M. Jenks, & R. Burgess (Eds.). *Compact cities. Sustainable urban forms for developing countries*. London: Spon Press.
- Echenique, M. H., Hargreaves, A. J., Mitchell, G., & Namdeo, A. (2012). Growing cities sustainably. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 78(2), 121–137. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2012.666731>.
- Eckstein, S. (1990). Urbanization revisited: Inner-city slum of hope and squatter settlement of despair. *World Development*, 18(2), 165–181. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(90\)90046-Z](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90046-Z).
- El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá (1961). *Acuerdo 30 de 1961*.
- El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá. Acuerdo 51 de 1963. (1963).
- El Concejo del Distrito Especial de Bogotá (1967). *Acuerdo 65 de 1967. Por el cual se señalan las normas y el procedimiento que deben cumplirse para urbanizar terrenos en el área del Distrito Especial de Bogotá y se dictan otras disposiciones*.
- El Consejo de Bogotá (1944). *Acuerdo 21 de 1944*.
- Fainstein, S. S., & Gordon, I. (1992). In M. Harloe (Ed.). *Divided cities: New York & London in the contemporary world*. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Pub.
- Gilbert, A., & Ward, P. M. (1985). *Housing, the state and the poor: Policy and practice in three Latin American cities*. Cambridge University Press.
- Glazewski, G. (2006). Segregation and seclusion: The case of compounds for western expatriates in Saudi Arabia. *GeoJournal*, 66(1), 83–88. <https://doi.org/10.1007/>

- s10708-006-9018-z.
- Glazze, G., & Alkhayyal, A. (2002). Gated housing estates in the Arab world: Case studies in Lebanon and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 29(3), 321–336. <https://doi.org/10.1068/b12825t>.
- Gómez, Y. (2012, September 24). *En Cedritos, las redes de servicios no dan abasto*. El Tiempo.
- Goossens, M. (2018). Ideas para la planeación de la ciudad futura. Bogotá, 1917–1925. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 28(1), 59–68. <https://doi.org/10.15446/bitacora.v28n1.59707>.
- Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). *Splintering urbanism: Networked infrastructures, technological mobilities and the urban condition*. Routledge.
- Griffin, E., & Ford, L. (1980). A model of Latin American City structure. *Geographical Review*, 70(4), 397–422. <https://doi.org/10.2307/214076>.
- Guzman, L. A., & Bocarejo, J. P. (2017). Urban form and spatial urban equity in Bogotá, Colombia. *Transportation Research Procedia*, 25, 4491–4506. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2017.05.345>.
- Guzman, L. A., Oviedo, D., & Bocarejo, J. P. (2017). City profile: The Bogotá metropolitan area that never was. *Cities*, 60, 202–215. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.09.004>.
- Hernández Osorio, C. (2015, September 15). Los financiadores de las campañas a la Alcaldía de Bogotá. Retrieved from El Espectador <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/los-financiadores-de-campanas-alcaldia-de-bogota-articulo-586164>.
- Huang, L., Yan, L., & Wu, J. (2016). Assessing urban sustainability of Chinese megacities: 35 years after the economic reform and open-door policy. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 145, 57–70. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2015.09.005>.
- Inostroza, L., Baur, R., & Csaplovics, E. (2013). Urban sprawl and fragmentation in Latin America: A dynamic quantification and characterization of spatial patterns. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 115, 87–97. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.11.007>.
- Irazábal, C. (2006). Localizing urban design traditions: Gated and edge cities in Curitiba. *Journal of Urban Design*, 11(1), 73–96.
- Janoschka, M. (2002). El nuevo modelo de la ciudad latinoamericana: Fragmentación y privatización. *EURE*, 28(85), 11–20. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0250-71612002008500002>.
- Janoschka, M., & Sequera, J. (2016). Gentrification in Latin America: Addressing the politics and geographies of displacement. *Urban Geography*, 37(8), 1175–1194. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2015.1103995>.
- Jiménez Romero, C., & Torres-Tovar, C. (2014). Proximidad obligada y densificación no planificada en Bogotá. Retrieved from <http://uvadoc.uva.es:80/handle/10324/10359>.
- Koch, F. (2015). The rules of the game and how to change them: Urban planning between formal and informal practices. A Colombian case study. *International Planning Studies*, 20(4), 407–423.
- Liberton de Duren, N., & Guerrero Compeán, R. (2016). Growing resources for growing cities: Density and the cost of municipal public services in Latin America. *Urban Studies*, 53(14), 3082–3107. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098015601579>.
- Liu, D., & Chen, N. (2017). Satellite monitoring of urban land change in the middle Yangtze River Basin urban agglomeration, China between 2000 and 2016. *Remote Sensing*, 9, 1086. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rs9111086>.
- Marín Correa, A., & Flórez Suárez, J. (2016, April 2). Constructores: Grandes dueños de la Van der Hammen. Retrieved from El Espectador <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/constructores-grandes-duenos-de-van-der-hammen-articulo-625149>.
- Massey, D. (1996). The age of extremes: Concentrated affluence and poverty in the twenty-first century. *Demography*, 33(4).
- Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1988). The dimensions of residential segregation. *Social Forces*, 67(2), 281–315. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/67.2.281>.
- Mele, C. (2011). Casinos, prisons, incinerators, and other fragments of neoliberal urban development. *Social Science History*, 35(3), 423–452 (Retrieved from JSTOR).
- Mollenkopf, J. H., & Castells, M. (1991). *Dual City: Restructuring New York*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Montenegro-Miranda, G. (2018). Edificación de gran altura y paisaje metropolitano. Reedificación versus reurbanización en Bogotá. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 28(2), 73–83. <https://doi.org/10.15446/bitacora.v28n2.68505>.
- Montoya, J. W. (2012). *Bogotá: Crecimiento Urbano y Cambio Morfológico, 1538–2010* (PhD) Quebec: Université Laval.
- NYU, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, & UN-Habitat (2010). Atlas of urban expansion. Retrieved February 5, 2018, from <http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/>.
- Ortiz, A. (2017, August). Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial. *Caso de Estudio: POT Bogotá*. Presented at the Cámara de Comercio Chapinero. Cámara de Comercio Chapinero.
- Otalora-Moya, V. (2014). *Incidenencias del proceso de metropolización de la Bogotá Ciudad Región en la transformación territorial de la sabana* (Primera edición). Bogotá: Universidad La Gran Colombia.
- Perlman, J. (1976). *The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio De Janeiro*. University of California Press.
- Perlman, J. (2010). *Favela: Four decades of living on the edge in Rio de Janeiro*. Oxford University Press.
- Rasse, A. (2015). Juntos pero no revueltos. Procesos de integración social en fronteras residenciales entre hogares de distinto nivel socioeconómico. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 41(122).
- Redacción El Tiempo (2016, August 7). Polémica por edificios de 31 pisos en Cedritos. Retrieved from El Tiempo <http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/edificios-de-31-pisos-en-cedritos-polemica-51735>.
- Rincón-Avellaneda, P. (2004). Análisis de los procesos de re-densificación en Bogotá ¿Una alternativa al crecimiento sostenible? *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 1(8), 82–92.
- Roberts, B. R. (2011). The consolidation of the Latin American City and the undermining of social cohesion. *City & Community*, 10(4), 414–423. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6040.2011.01378.x>.
- Robinson, J. (2011). Cities in a world of cities: The comparative gesture. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00982.x>.
- Ruiz-Tagle, J. (2015). La persistencia de la segregación y la desigualdad en barrios socialmente diversos: Un estudio de caso en La Florida, Santiago. *EURE*, 125, 42. Retrieved from <http://www.eure.cl/index.php/eure/article/view/1330>.
- Sabatini, F., & Brain, I. (2008). La segregación, los guetos y la integración social urbana: Mitos y claves. *EURE*, 34, 103. Retrieved from <http://www.eure.cl/index.php/eure/article/view/1361>.
- Sabatini, F., & Salcedo, R. (2007). Gated communities and the poor in Santiago, Chile: Functional and symbolic integration in a context of aggressive capitalist colonization of lower-class areas. *Housing Policy Debate*, 18(3), 577–606. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2007.9521612>.
- Salazar-Ferro, J. (2007). La planeación de Bogotá: Un sistema híbrido de desarrollo progresivo. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, 11(1), 208–219.
- Salcedo, R. (2010). The last slum: Moving from illegal settlements to subsidized home ownership in Chile. *Urban Affairs Review*, 46(1), 90–118. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087410368487>.
- Saldarriaga-Roa, A. (2000). *Bogotá Siglo XX: Urbanismo, Arquitectura y Vida Urbana*. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C.
- Santana-Rivas, L. D. (2013). *Precariópolis y privatópolis en la región metropolitana de Bogotá (1990–2010). Un análisis socioespacial de los barrios cerrados* (Master Thesis) Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Sassen, S. (2013). *The global city*. New York, London, Tokyo: Princeton University Press.
- Schapiro, M.-F. P., & Pineda, R. C. (2008). Buenos Aires: La fragmentación en los intersticios de una sociedad polarizada. *EURE*, 34(103).
- SDP, & UNAL (2013). *Segregación Socioeconómica en el espacio urbano de Bogotá D.C* (1st ed.). Retrieved from http://www.sdp.gov.co/portal/page/portal/PortalSDP/actualidad-SDP-home/Segregacion_Socioeconomica_Espacio_Urbano_Bogota_Junio_0.pdf.
- Sitte, C. (1889). City planning according to artistic principles. In C. Collins, & G. Collins (Eds.). *Camillo Sitte: The birth of modern city planning* (pp. 480). Courier Corporation.
- Thibert, J., & Osorio, G. A. (2014). Urban segregation and metropolitics in Latin America: The case of Bogotá, Colombia. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38(4), 1319–1343. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12021>.
- Till, J., & Schneider, T. (2012). Invisible agency. *Architectural Design*, 82(4), 38–43. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ad.1426>.
- Turner, J. F. C. (1976). *Housing by people: Towards autonomy in building environments*. Marion Boyars.
- Turok, I. (2011). Deconstructing density: Strategic dilemmas confronting the post-Apartheid city. *Cities*, 28, 470–477. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2010.10.003>.
- UN-Habitat (2015). *International guidelines on urban and territorial planning*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- van Kempen, R. (2007). Divided cities in the 21st century: Challenging the importance of globalisation. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 22(1), 13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10901-006-9064-3>.
- Vergara Vidal, J. E. (2017). Verticalización. La edificación en altura en la Región Metropolitana de Santiago (1990–2014). *Revista INVI*, 32(90), 9–49. <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-83582017000200009>.
- Wheeler, S. M. (2015). Built landscapes of metropolitan regions: An international typology. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 81(3), 167–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2015.1081567>.
- Yunda, J. G. (2019). Densificación y estratificación social en Bogotá: Distribución sesgada de la inversión privada. *Revista EURE-Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales*, 134, 45. Retrieved from <http://www.eure.cl/index.php/eure/article/view/2665>.
- Zhu, J. (2012). Development of sustainable urban forms for high-density low-income Asian countries: The case of Vietnam. *Cities*, 29, 77–87.

Juan G. Yunda is Assistant Professor at the department of Architecture of the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. He holds a PhD in Community and Regional Planning from The University of Texas at Austin, a BA in Architecture from the National University of Colombia and an MSc in Urban Design and Urban Planning from the Bauhaus-Weimar University and the Tongji University in Shanghai. His research focuses on issues of urban form, morphology, zoning and land uses with a special focus on social equity. As an Architect-Urbanist, he has collaborated on urban design and architecture projects for international firms in Colombia, Germany and China, and as a consultant in urban planning for different public and private institutions on issues of transportation, affordable housing and zoning.

Bjørn Sletto is Associate Professor in the School of Architecture at The University of Texas at Austin. He received his doctorate in City and Regional Planning from Cornell University and focuses on indigenous land rights, environmental and social justice, and alternative planning approaches in Latin America. As the director of the Institute of Latin American Studies' (LLILAS) Research Initiative in Participatory Mapping, he works closely with partner institutions in South America to further international scholarship on representational politics, indigenous territoriality and social justice. He is also engaged with research on informality and community development in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, focusing on the role of critical pedagogy for democratic and inclusive planning in low-income neighborhoods that have long been excluded from formal development processes.